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Did John Nash anticipate evolutionary game theory in his 1950 dissertation?
Young [7] suggests he did, based on the following passage, which can be seen
as introducing the random-matching population games that are the basis of
Maynard Smith’s (Maynard Smith and Price [4]; Maynard Smith [3]) evolution-
ary approach:
We shall now take up the “mass-action” interpretation of equi-
librium points. In this interpretation solutions have no great signif-
icance. It is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full
knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ability and in-
clination to go through any complex reasoning processes. But the
participants are supposed to accumulate empirical information on
the relative advantages of the various pure strategies at their dis-
posal.
To be more detailed, we assume that there is a population (in
thesense ofstatistics)of participantsforeach positionofthe game.
Let us also assume that the “average playing” of the game involves
n participantsselectedatrandomfromthen populations, andthat
there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy is
employed by the “average member” of the appropriate population
[...] Thustheassumptionswemadeinthis“mass-action”interpre-
tation lead to the conclusion that the mixed strategies representing
the average behavior in each of the populations form an equilib-
rium point [...] Actually, of course, we can only expect some sort of
approximateequilibrium,sincetheinformation,itsutilization,and
thestabilityoftheaveragefrequencieswillbeimperfect. (Nash[5].)
Nash here says nothing very explicit about any evolutionary selection dy-
namics leading to equilibrium play. Young, along with, e.g., Leonard [2] and
Hofbauer [1], interprets the passage to be about a best-response dynamics,
where players respond myopically to the current population distribution. But
2Player 2
s1 s2
Player 1 s1 1,1 0,0
s2 0,0 1,1
Table 1: A coordination game.
even without this latter reading, as we shall see, there is a sense in which a no-
tion of evolutionary stability is implicit in the discussion.
Takingthe“mass-action”storyliterallyitseemsnaturaltostudyﬁnitepopu-
lations. But then some equilibria of the underlying game cannot be supported
as “mass-action” equilibria. Consider a non-trivial symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium of a symmetric normal-form game. Suppose we try to implement
this equilibrium in a setting where a ﬁnite population of individuals, who are
onlyallowedtoplaypurestrategies,arerandomlymatchedtoplayourunderly-
inggame. AsNashnotes, “thestabilityoftheaveragefrequencieswillbeimper-
fect,” since it cannot be the case that each individual faces the average strategy,
as the individual’s own strategy choice affects the average.
Nash’s “mass-action” idea therefore carries within it its own reﬁnement or
stability notion. The fact that an individual’s strategy choice in the ﬁnite popu-
lation game holds information itself affecting that choice acts as a perturbation
of the strategy distribution at the equilibrium. In the following we shall see that
requiring stability in the face of such perturbations is, indeed, closely related
to Maynard Smith’s [3] concept of evolutionary stability. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
a non-artifactuality criterion for equilibria of symmetric 2-player games and
show that it is equivalent to neutral stability for completely mixed strategies in
2×2 games.
32 Finite Population Games: Examples
Consider the game in Table 1. It has three equilibria, one where both players
play s1, one where both players play s2, and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which the players play each of their pure strategies with probability .5.
Now consider the same game played by many pairs of players, randomly
matched from an uncountably inﬁnite population. Such a game has one equi-
libriumwhereallplayersplays1,onewhereallplayersplays2,andoneinwhich
half of the players play s1 and the other half play s2.
The latter equilibrium, which implements in the population game version
the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the original game, has nothing that corre-
sponds to it in a game played by a ﬁnite population. To see this, suppose the
number of players is n ≥2, with n even. Suppose half of the players play s1, the
other half s2. Then an s1-player will be matched with another s1-player with
probability (n −2)/2(n −1), and with an s2-player with probability n/2(n −1),














which is strictly greater. A similar disincentive holds for any s2-player. Hence
fornoﬁniten isthereanequilibriuminwhichhalfoftheplayersplays1 andthe
other half play s2. That there is such an equilibrium in the inﬁnite-population
case is an artifact of that special setting.
In the Battle-of-the-Sexes game of Table 2, on the other hand, there is a
unique symmetric equilibrium in which each player plays s1 with probability
2/3. This equilibrium does have “mass-action” equivalents. Suppose 2/3 of the
n players in the population game play s1, the rest s2. Each s1-player is then









Player 1 s1 0,0 2,1
s2 1,2 0,0
Table 2: The Battle of the Sexes.







his expected payoff if instead he played s2. Similarly, s2-players are also playing
best replies.
It also so happens that the equilibrium mixed strategy of the second ex-
ample is an evolutionarily stable strategy in the sense of Maynard Smith [3],
whereas that of the ﬁrst example is not. Maynard Smith’s idea was that in or-
der to survive evolutionary selection, a strategy when employed by all players
of a large population who are randomly matched in pairs to play symmetric 2-
player games should be stable against a small invasion of players doing some-
thing different. As we have seen, in ﬁnite populations the fact that no single
player can face the population distribution, or average strategy, without distor-
tion, in effect introduces small “mutations” around the equilibrium. We now
go on to study this relationship in more detail.
3 Non-Artifactuality
Let G be a symmetric, 2-player, ﬁnite, normal form game with common pure
strategy set S. Let Σ be the set of mixed strategies of G, where, if σ ∈ Σ, σ(s)
is the probability assigned by σ to the pure strategy s. The payoff function
u:S ×S → R is extended in the standard fashion to mixed strategies. Symmetry
means that if one player is playing s and the other s0, then the s-player’s payoff
is u(s,s0) and the other’s is u(s0,s).
5We now want to capture the idea from the previous section of equilibria
of G that have something corresponding to them in a ﬁnite population game
with random matching. The following deﬁnition seems to do this, while at the
same time abstracting from problems that have to do with the fact that in ﬁnite
populations, an average strategy can only involve probabilities that are rational
numbers.
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric strategy proﬁle (σ,σ) of G is non-artifactual if there















Observation 1 If (σ,σ) is non-artifactual, then (σ,σ) is an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose (σ,σ) is not an equilibrium. Then there must be some pure
strategy s in the support of σ that is not a best reply to σ. That is, there exist
s ∈S with σ(s) > 0 and s0 ∈S such that u(s,σ) < u(s0,σ). The inequality in the










We shall therefore in the following refer to non-artifactual strategy proﬁles
and non-artifactual equilibria interchangeably.
The following lemma provides a convenient alternative characterization of
non-artifactuality.
Lemma 1 Let (σ,σ) be an equilibrium of G. Then (σ,σ) is non-artifactual if
and only if u(s0,s) ≥ u(s,s) for all s0 ∈ S with u(s0,σ) = u(σ,σ) and all s ∈ S
with σ(s)>0.
6Proof. The idea here is that if u(s0,σ) = u(σ,σ), then s0 and s are both best
replies to σ. If also u(s,s)>u(s0,s), then s0 must be doing better than s against
the other strategies s00 6= s in the support of σ. Then it is proﬁtable for an s-
player to deviate to s0 since he faces more of the other strategies and less of s.
Conversely, if " is small enough, then it is only proﬁtable to deviate to a strategy
s0 that is a best reply to σ and such that u(s0,s)<u(s,s).
Toseethisformally,supposethatu(s0,s)≥u(s,s)foralls0 ∈S withu(s0,σ)=
u(σ,σ) and all s ∈ S with σ(s) > 0. Let µ > 0 be such that µ ≥ u(s,s)−u(s0,s)
for all s0,s ∈S. Let δ >0 be such that
u(σ,σ)−u(s
0,σ)>δµ (1)
for all s0 ∈ S with u(s0,σ) < u(σ,σ). As shown below, this δ has the desired
property.
Let s ∈S be such that σ(s) > 0 and let s0 ∈S be arbitrary. We have to show















































The last equivalence uses that u(s,σ) = u(σ,σ) since (σ,σ) is an equilibrium









u(σ,σ), or u(s0,σ) < u(σ,σ). If we have u(s0,σ) < u(σ,σ), then (1) holds and
this implies that (3) holds for all " ∈ (0,δ). If we have u(s0,σ) = u(σ,σ), then,
by assumption, u(s0,s) ≥ u(s,s), and (3) holds trivially since the left hand side
is 0 and the right hand side is non-positive. This completes the “if” part of the
proof.
To prove the converse implication, suppose that there exists s0,s ∈ S, such
that u(s0,σ) = u(σ,σ), σ(s) > 0, and u(s0,s) < u(s,s). For these s0,s, the in-
equality (3) does not hold for any " >0 since the left hand side is 0 and the right
hand side is positive, so (σ,σ) is not non-artifactual. 
Corollary 1 Supposeσisacompletelymixedstrategysuchthat(σ,σ)isanequi-
librium of G. Then (σ,σ) is non-artifactual if and only if each s ∈ S is a worst
reply to itself.
Proof. The strategy proﬁle (σ,σ) is such that σ(s)>0 for all s ∈S and u(s0,σ)=
u(σ,σ) for all s0 ∈ S. Hence Lemma 1 implies that (σ,σ) is non-artifactual if
and only if u(s0,s)≥u(s,s) for all s,s0 ∈S. 
Corollary 2 Supposeσisacompletelymixedstrategysuchthat(σ,σ)isanequi-
librium of the 2×2 game G. Then (σ,σ) is non-artifactual if and only if s1 is a
best reply to s2 and s2 is a best reply to s1.
Proof. This follows from Corollary 1. 
Proposition 1 IfG is a 2×2 game, then it has a non-artifactual equilibrium.
Proof. If s1 is a best reply to s1, then (s1,s1) is a non-artifactual equilibrium. If
s2 is a best reply to s2, then (s2,s2) is a non-artifactual equilibrium. Suppose
that s1 is not a best reply to s1 and that s2 is not a best reply to s2. Then, since
a symmetric equilibrium must exist, there is a competely mixed strategy σ that
is a best reply to itself. Since s2 is a best reply to s1 and s1 is a best reply to s2
Corollary 2 implies that (σ,σ) is non-artifactual. 
8Player 2
s1 s2
Player 1 s1 1,1 1,1
s2 1,1 1,1
Table 3: No ESS.
4 Evolutionary Stability
We next relate non-artifactuality to evolutionary stability. Maynard Smith (e.g.,
Maynard Smith [3]) deﬁned an evolutionarily stable strategy as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 A strategy σ ofG is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for all






The ESS notion involves the idea that a strategy is stable if when it is played
by the entire population, any small group of invading mutants playing some
other strategy would do strictly worse in the perturbed population. Although
Maynard Smith originally did not propose any explicit dynamics to support
ESS, it has been shown to correspond to asymptotically stable states of the
replicator dynamics, a model of asexual reproduction (Taylor and Jonker [6]).
NoteverygamehasanESS,however. Inthe2×2gameofTable3everysym-
metric pair of strategies is non-artifactual, but the game has no ESS. Maynard
Smith also proposed the following weakening of the ESS criterion, which only
requires that a strategy should do at least as well as that played by any small
invading group of mutants.
Deﬁnition 3 Astrategyσ ofG isaneutrallystablestrategy(NSS)ifforallσ0 ∈Σ








Player 1 s1 1,1 1,1
s2 1,1 2,2
Table 4: A counterexample.
Proposition 2 Suppose σ is an NSS of the 2 × 2 game G. Then (σ,σ) is non-
artifactual.
Proof. If σ(s1) = 1 or σ(s2) = 1, then the implication holds trivially since all
symmetric pure strategy equilibria are non-artifactual. Assume by way of con-
tradiction that there exists a completely mixed strategy σ such that σ is an NSS
but (σ,σ) is not non-artifactual. By Corollary 2, we then either have that s1 is
not a best reply to s2 or that s2 is not a best reply to s1. Assume, without loss of
generality since the strategies can be relabelled, that s1 is not a best reply to s2,
i.e., that we have that
u(s1,s2)<u(s2,s2). (4)
Since (σ,σ) is a completely mixed equilibrium, all strategies σ0 are best replies





for all σ0. In particular, it holds for σ0 =s2 that
u(s2,s2)≤u(σ,s2)=σ(s1)u(s1,s2)+σ(s2)u(s2,s2). (5)
Using (4) in (5) yields
u(s2,s2)<σ(s1)u(s2,s2)+σ(s2)u(s2,s2)=u(s2,s2).
Since the inequality u(s2,s2) < u(s2,s2) cannot hold, we conclude that no such
σ can exist. 
10It is not the case that every non-artifactual equilibrium of a 2×2 game in-
volvesaneutrallystablestrategy. InthegameofTable4,(s1,s1)isnon-artifactual,




Proposition 3 Suppose σ is a completely mixed strategy such that (σ,σ) is non-
artifactual in the 2×2 gameG. Then σ is an NSS.































x (x +σ(s1))(u(s1,s1)−u(s2,s1))+x (σ(s2)−x)(u(s1,s2)−u(s2,s2))≤0.
11Player 2
s1 s2 s3
Player 1 s1 1,1 2,0 0,2
s2 0,2 1,1 2,0
s3 2,0 0,2 1,1
Table 5: A 3×3 counterexample.




The coefﬁcient of the x term is
σ(s1)u(s1,s1)+σ(s2)u(s1,s2)−σ(s1)u(s2,s1)−σ(s2)u(s2,s2)
which is equal to u(s1,σ) − u(s2,σ). Since both s1 and s2 are best replies to
σ, this number is 0 and the x term disappears. We can conclude that to com-
plete the proof it is sufﬁcient to show that the coefﬁcient of the x2 term is non-
positive. That is, it is sufﬁcient to show that
u(s1,s1)−u(s2,s1)+u(s2,s2)−u(s1,s2)≤0.
This inequality does indeed hold, since s2 is a best reply to s1 and s1 is a best
reply to s2. 
As we go beyond the family of 2 × 2 games, it is no longer the case that
neutral stability of a completely mixed strategy implies non-artifactuality. The
Rock-Scissors-Paper game of Table 5 has a unique NSS such that each of the
threepurestrategiesareplayedwithequalprobability, butapairofsuchstrate-
gies is not a non-artifactual equilibrium. For instance, in the ﬁnite population
game an s1-player meets another s1-player with probability less than 1/3, but
each of s2 and s3 with probability greater than 1/3, so s2 is a better reply.
12Player 2
s1 s2 s3
Player 1 s1 0,0 6,6 0,2
s2 6,6 0,0 0,2
s3 2,0 2,0 2,2
Table 6: Another 3×3 counterexample.
Nor is it the case that completely mixed non-artifactual equilibria necessar-
ily involve neutrally stable strategies in the 3×3 case. Consider the game of Ta-
ble 6. All equilibria of this game are non-artifactual since each pure strategy is
a worst reply to itself. In particular, the equilibrium (σ,σ) with σ(s1) = σ(s2) =
σ(s3) = 1/3 is non-artifactual. Let σ0 be the strategy with σ0(s1) = σ0(s2) = 1/2.
























That is, we have u(σ,σ0) < u(σ0,σ0). Since we also have u(σ0,σ) = u(σ,σ), σ
cannot be an NSS.
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